Income shifting from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions is considered a primary method of reducing worldwide tax burdens of multinational firms. Current losses also affect incomeshifting incentives. We extend prior approaches by explicitly considering unprofitable affiliates and test whether the association between losses and tax incentives for unprofitable affiliates deviates from the negative association observed in profitable affiliates. Results suggest that multinational firms alter the distribution of reported profits to take advantage of losses. Our point estimate for profitable affiliates implies that an increase of one standard deviation in the tax incentive, C, of an affiliate with average return on assets of 13.3 is associated with a lower return on assets of 0.5 percentage points. The same change in tax incentive of an unprofitable affiliate is associated with an increase in its return on assets of approximately 0.7 percentage points, holding assets, labor, productivity and other factors constant. We further document a larger responsiveness to tax incentives between profitable and unprofitable affiliates in high-tax jurisdictions, consistent with predictions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior research in accounting, finance, and economics finds that firms undertake a strategy of shifting income out of high-tax jurisdictions into low-tax jurisdictions, thus reporting lower profit in high-tax affiliates and higher profit in low-tax affiliates.
1 In a multinational firm with only profitable affiliates, this shifting strategy results in tax savings equal to the dollars of income shifted times the rate differential between the affiliates, net of any costs.
Researchers generally determine intra-firm tax incentives using either the statutory tax rate or an aggregated effective tax rate. These methods mask an alternative tax-saving recipient of shifted income: an unprofitable, or loss, affiliate. Ignoring the potential benefit of loss carryback, a loss affiliate potentially becomes a temporary, low-tax-rate affiliate because it can have a marginal tax rate much lower than the statutory tax rate. As a result, a firm may shift less income out of an affiliate with a loss than would be expected if the affiliate were profitable. With more aggressive tax planning, a firm may even shift income from profitable affiliates into loss affiliates, reporting lower profit in the profitable affiliates and smaller losses in the loss affiliates.
An income shifting strategy that exploits the lower marginal tax rates of loss affiliates is costly. Efficient transfer pricing strategies can be expensive to put in place and thus are often set over a multi-year period. 2 Moving income to benefit from a loss affiliate necessitates new transactions, re-characterizing the nature of existing transactions, or reorganizing the global supply chain. Each of these requires creation of supporting documentation, procurement of professional services/advice, and/or a reduction in the probability of sustaining a position on 1 See for example, Collins, Kemsley and Lang (1998); Klassen, Lang and Wolfson (1993) ; Desai and Dharmapala (2006) ; Huizinga and Laeven (2008) ; Weichenrieder (2009) ; Klassen and Laplante (2012) ; Dharmapala and Riedel (2013) ; Dharmapala (2014); and Dyreng and Markle (2015) .
2 Transfer prices are the prices a multinational group sets for intercompany transfers of intangible goods, services, rights to exploit intellectual property, and debt (Singh and Mathur 2013) and is a mechanism by which multinational groups shift income across jurisdictions in response to tax incentives. We do not directly observe intercompany transfers but rather follow the literature cited above that infers income-tax motivated transfer prices from the relation between tax incentives and unexpected profit.
audit. Further, affiliate losses may be short lived as the affiliate often returns to profitability or ceases operation. 3 Finally, though firms must consider both the current and the projected taxpaying status of each affiliate when implementing an income shifting strategy, predicting the future tax-paying status is more difficult for loss affiliates than for profitable affiliates. Whether the tax savings from this strategy outweigh the costs necessary to deviate from the "traditional"
high-tax to low-tax income shifting strategy examined in prior work is an empirical question. Our paper uses affiliate-level data to explore responses to the income shifting incentives generated by loss affiliates. To include loss affiliates in the traditional logged Cobb-Douglas profit prediction model, we measure profitability as return on assets plus one. 4 We specify affiliate profitability as a function of labor, assets, productivity, age, macroeconomic and industry-level shocks, and tax incentives on a sample that includes loss affiliates.
We first examine the relation between affiliate pre-tax earnings and the composite tax incentive variable, C, developed by Huizinga and Laeven (2008) . We expect the relation between profit and tax incentives to be negative in the presence of income shifting (Hines and Rice, 1994) . Consistent with prior literature using only profitable affiliates, we estimate an increase of one percent in a profitable affiliate's composite tax incentive is associated with a 0.75 percent decrease in reported profitability on the mean ROA.
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Despite potential costs to altering the transfer pricing strategy to exploit losses, we hypothesize that this relation will be less negative, or even positive, for affiliates with losses. We 3 It is possible for a multinational to continue to operate an affiliate with structural losses due to strategic or other reasons. However, one would expect this to be rare because structural losses are costly to the global firm. 4 Claessens and Laeven (2004) also adopt this transformation of the traditional logged Cobb-Douglas profit prediction model in order to include unprofitable banks in their cross-jurisdictional study of bank competition. We examine the effect of this choice below. Consistent with many income shifting studies, we use reported book (financial statement) income as a proxy for taxable income (Claessens and Laeven 2004; De Simone 2016; Dharmapala and Riedel 2013; Hines and Rice 1994; Huizinga and Laeven 2008; Klassen, Lang and Wolfson 1993; Klasssen and Laplante 2012; Markle 2015) . 5 See Section IV for a discussion of interpreting changes in C.
estimate a positive coefficient on the interaction of the composite tax incentive variable and an indicator for current period loss, consistent with this expectation. Further, we estimate that an increase of one percent in the composite tax incentive of loss affiliates is associated with a 1.24 percent increase in profitability on average. Due to concerns regarding the composite tax variable, we repeat our above analysis using the statutory tax rate and estimate similar results. 6 Thus, we show that the overall relation between tax incentives and pre-tax earnings for loss affiliates is positive, consistent with a strategy of shifting profits to loss affiliates, on average.
We next consider the subset of affiliates we expect to alter their transfer prices the most.
When adjustments costs are very high or benefits are very low, the firm's global tax benefits of altering the income shifting will not exceed the costs. Comparing reported profit under a shift-toloss strategy with reported profit under a traditional strategy, we expect that the strengthening of existing incentives in low-tax affiliates will be less disruptive (less costly) but also less beneficial than the sign change of incentives in high-tax affiliates. 7 Thus, we hypothesize that the level of the underlying tax rate alters the magnitude of the relation between unexpected profit and the tax incentive for loss affiliates and separate affiliates by the magnitude of their jurisdictions' statutory tax rate. Results confirm that the responsiveness of unexpected profits to the tax incentives of low-tax loss affiliates is significantly less negative than that of low-tax profitable affiliates. Further, the difference in responsiveness between profitable and loss affiliates is even greater for affiliates located in high-tax rate jurisdictions. That the difference in response between profitable and loss affiliates is increasing in the jurisdictions' tax rates supports our second hypothesis. 6 The composite tax variable requires information on all affiliates of a multinational corporation to be complete and is especially susceptible to omitted information about low-tax affiliates, such as loss or tax haven affiliates. These limitations are discussed in more detail in Section IV. 7 A low-tax loss affiliate is expected to receive shifted income under both the traditional and "shift-to-loss" strategies. A high-tax loss affiliate, in contrast, is expected to provide shifted income in a traditional strategy but receive shifted income in a shift-to-loss strategy. We refer to this as a sign change in shifting incentives.
Finally, we explore in more detail the effect of loss affiliates within a corporate group.
We estimate the relation between profitability and tax incentives for three groups of affiliates based on both their profit status and that of their affiliated members. The three groups are profitable affiliates in firms in which all affiliates are profitable, profitable affiliates in firms in which some affiliates report losses, and loss affiliates. We continue to estimate an overall positive coefficient on the interaction between loss and tax incentives for loss affiliates. We further estimate that profitable affiliates with at least one loss affiliate report profits that are less negatively related to their tax incentives than profitable affiliates in an entirely profitable group.
This provides further evidence that the existence of loss affiliates disrupts the traditional pattern of income shifting.
This paper is in the spirit of Gramlich, Limpaphayom, and Rhee (2004) and Onji and Vera (2010) , who study income shifting among Japanese keiretsu members. The lower incidence of losses in affiliated members, relative to unaffiliated members, they document suggests affiliated groups band together to save keiretsu-level income taxes. 8 We contribute to this literature by using a cross-border sample to test tax-motivated shift-to-loss income shifting and by documenting that loss affiliates affect the reported profitability of affiliated firms.
This study informs policy makers who, in light of increased multinational income shifting and the recent economic downturn, are debating how to curb tax base erosion and profit shifting (OECD, 2013; Saint-Amans and Russo, 2013) . Based on our results, revenue authorities would benefit from considering both affiliates in low-tax jurisdictions and affiliates in jurisdictions or industries experiencing losses as potential recipients of the profits they hope to recover. Also, our study provides evidence that firms will respond to even temporary tax-minimizing opportunities despite non-trivial costs, which contributes to policy maker analyses of altering tax policies targeted at multinational corporations, such as repatriation tax holidays, temporary tax incentives for foreign direct investors, and patent boxes.
Furthermore, our results inform public economists regarding the semi-elasticity of reported income to changes in tax rates. Our paper suggests that, by using samples of only profitable affiliates, previous estimates of the magnitudes of income shifting in response to tax rate changes should be considered a lower bound. 9 Some shifting by profitable affiliates goes to loss affiliates, rather than to low-tax profitable affiliates. Additionally, because losses are expected to be transitory in general (Hayn, 1995; Frankel and Litov, 2009) , the incentives to shift to a loss affiliate would be less affected than by a change in the statutory tax rate. Thus, for both reasons above, previous estimates generated using only profitable affiliates reflect muted responses to tax rate differences. Our analysis demonstrates that the semi-elasticity for profitable affiliates increases from 0.81 to 1.50 when the presence of loss affiliates is fully considered.
Our results also encourage researchers to consider the impact of this alternative taxreducing transfer pricing strategy. Many income shifting studies use aggregated affiliate profits and losses (i.e., consolidated financial statement data), which confounds the two types of income shifting strategies by combining a number of potentially-conflicting transfer pricing incentives.
Other income shifting studies restrict their sample to profitable observations. 10 The removal of loss affiliates does not fully address the concern, though, because the effect of shifting to these affiliates is also reflected in the responsiveness of profitable affiliates to their tax incentives. Our supplemental tests show a significant difference in response between profitable affiliates without 9 Hopland, Lisowsky, Mardan and Schindler (2015) examine levels of payments between affiliated firms in Norway and also find an understatement of sensitivity of transfer prices to tax rate changes in prior literature. 10 For example, Power and Silverstein (2007) Finally, this study deepens our understanding of the income shifting practices of multinational firms. Examining a new and economically significant income shifting setting helps answer the call in Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) to increase our ability to explain and predict income-shifting strategies. Additionally, Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) point out that researchers understand little about how the existence of a loss affects firm behavior. Our results suggest that firms alter their transfer prices to take advantage of losses and that affiliates in high-tax jurisdictions experience a more significant alteration than do affiliates in low-tax jurisdictions.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED LITERATURE

Income Shifting Background
The most effective income shifting strategies employ two components in concert with each other: an operational decision and an accounting decision. The operational decision entails tax-efficiently structuring the firm's global supply chain to strategically locate the affiliated parties to major intercompany transactions. As such, multinationals often concentrate higherreturn assets and activities in low-tax jurisdictions.
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Further, multinationals have incentives to choose prices for intercompany transactions that optimize the worldwide tax burden of the firm; this represents the accounting decision component. Transfer pricing guidelines for income tax reporting are established by the OECD and have been adopted in some form by most European countries. These regulations prescribe that for the purposes of calculating taxable income, any intercompany prices for goods, services 11 An example of a higher-return activity is the research and development of unique intangibles. Interestingly, the OECD explicitly excludes tax-motivated location decisions from its definition of base erosion and profit shifting, or BEPS (OECD 2015, 42) , defining profit shifting as the movement of taxable profits away from the economic activity generating those profits.
and intangibles should be those that would have been realized if the parties were unrelated, known as the "arm's length principle" (OECD, 2010) . However, arm's length prices can be difficult to observe, especially for services, unique intangibles, and unusual or unfinished products (PWC, 2006) . This inability to always find exact market price matches for intercompany transactions leaves multinational entities some discretion in setting transfer prices.
Further, although many multinationals strive to appropriately price a transaction during the course of the year, they can also make so-called "topside adjustments" to these prices after the financial books have been closed but prior to the filing of the tax return. 12 Thus, the accounting decision for how and when to set the transfer price of an intercompany transaction is flexible and relatively nimble when compared to the operational decision.
When a multinational firm anticipates an affiliate will earn a loss, the multinational has a number of options. First, the affiliate could simply report the loss as earned under its existing transfer-pricing strategy. If its jurisdiction allows loss carryback and it was profitable during the allowed carryback period, the reported loss will generate an immediate refund. If its jurisdiction does not allow loss carryback (or if it was not profitable during the allowed carryback period) but does allow loss carryforward, the reported loss will generate tax savings in the future if the affiliate returns to profitability. If the jurisdiction of the reported loss does not allow loss carryback or loss carryforward, the reported loss generates no tax benefit for the multinational firm. Thus, both the adjustment costs and the benefits are lowest under this option.
Second, in certain jurisdictions, the multinational firm may be able to consolidate across borders to offset a loss in one jurisdiction with a profit in another jurisdiction. For example,
France and Denmark have long-standing cross border consolidation policies with other EU 12 Because we rely on affiliate financial statement information, we are unable to measure the impact of these topside adjustments. However, to the extent topside adjustments are used to implement a shift-to-loss strategy, the omission of topside adjustments in our tests biases against our ability to detect this type of income shifting behavior. member states. However, due to system limitations such as long lock-in periods and the inability to selectively consolidate only certain affiliates, few multinational companies take advantage of them. 13 This suggests that using cross border consolidation policies is very costly.
Third, the multinational firm can undertake real activities at the affiliate to minimize the loss. 14 For example, the multinational could move research and development activities to a more profitable affiliate or, as a more extreme example, move a physical factory from one jurisdiction to another. This option likely entails significant adjustment costs and will result in a less taxefficient structure in the future, assuming the affiliate returns to profitability.
Finally, the multinational can adjust transfer prices to minimize the reported loss.
Because transfer prices have some inherent flexibility, a multinational could potentially reduce taxes using a traditional strategy when all affiliates are profitable, but alter this strategy-to a shift-to-loss strategy-when losses occur in some affiliates. While this option is more costly than the first option (i.e., no response), adjusting transfer prices also generates new tax savings.
The inherent flexibility in transfer prices arises because market prices for intercompany transactions can be difficult to observe. Firms generally construct a range of prices based on inexact "comparables," or companies with a similar business profile. Any well-supported price within the range generated using such methods can be used as the transfer price, and as such, firms often choose the most tax-favored end of the range.
For example, firms with a high-tax affiliate that is purchasing services from a low-tax affiliate will choose a price at the high end of the range to minimize profits in the relatively hightax jurisdiction and maximize profits in the relatively low-tax jurisdiction. If the high-tax affiliate 13 For example, through 2005, only 13 French companies had opted for cross border consolidation (Dorsey & Whitney LLP, 2006) . 14 We assume that the aggregate level of the multinational's activities was optimal but that its allocation of activities to affiliates was not. Thus, activities are moved rather than increased or decreased.
instead earns a loss, it has several options. First, and least costly, the firm can keep the previous price. Second, the firm can choose a transfer price at the other end of the range to minimize the reported loss. Third, the firm can search for additional or a new set of independent comparable transactions in order to expand the range to include a more favorable endpoint. This change will require some new documentation to support the new range. Finally, if necessary, the firm can identify risks that resulted in the loss (e.g., foreign currency exchange or product failure risk), or other previously uncompensated transactions that the affiliate is party to, and compensate the loss affiliate for that previously un-priced contribution. However, this last option potentially sets a precedent for less tax-favored outcomes in profitable years. Which response the firm will choose will depend on the tax savings and the costs associated with each alternative.
Related Literature
The literature abounds with evidence that firms reduce income taxes by shifting taxable income from relatively higher-tax jurisdictions to lower-tax jurisdictions. Grubert and Mutti (1991) exploit the relation between profitability and the tax rate as a measure of income shifting and variants of their research design are often used in the literature. Klassen, Lang, and Wolfson (1993) use a similar methodology to study changes in income shifting behavior in response to tax rate changes, while Hines and Rice (1994) employ the research design to study the use of tax havens. The approach of Hines and Rice has become common as a general model of multinational income shifting (Dharmapala, 2014).
Alternative methods for studying tax-motivated income shifting have also been developed. Jacob (1996) and Clausing (2006) While there is ample evidence of tax-motivated income shifting by multinational firms, the literature has largely focused on the benefit of shifting income from higher-tax affiliates to lower-tax affiliates and ignored the benefit of shifting income from a profitable affiliate to a loss affiliate. 15 Because the presence of a loss affiliate can alter the income shifting incentives of relatively low-tax profitable affiliates, this omission may profoundly affect the measurement of income shifting. Although Klassen et al. (1993) discuss the difficulty in measuring the tax incentives of unprofitable firms and the potential confounding effect losses have on taxmotivated income shifting behavior, to our knowledge, only Gramlich et al. (2004) and Onji and Vera (2010) attempt to test the effect of loss affiliates on reported profits.
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Both Gramlich et al. (2004) and Onji and Vera (2010) find that members of Japanese keiretsu groups (member firms) appear to alter their transfer prices in the presence of loss members. Although these results support loss-related income shifting, their data do not allow the variation in tax rates necessary to directly study the relation between tax rates and profitability.
Further, the costs and benefits of shifting income between keiretsu members differ from those associated with foreign affiliates in a commonly-controlled group.
In a concurrent study that complements ours, Hopland et al. (2015) examine the levels of intercompany payments of firms in Norway in the presence of loss affiliates, finding that some transfer prices are flexible enough to mitigate affiliate losses. Specifically, they document that loss affiliates exhibit lower net outgoing transfer payments relative to profitable affiliates, and that this reduction appears to stem from intercompany transfers for intangibles (rather than tangible goods or debt) via topside, tax-only adjustments. Our study increases the external validity of their findings by extending the analysis to a multinational setting, allowing an identification strategy that exploits differences in tax incentives across multinational groups and jurisdictions. Our study further differs by estimating tax-motivated income shifting from reported book profits, which are more widely available. We provide evidence that the reported book profits of multinational firms also respond to affiliated losses, suggesting that multinational groups respond quickly to affiliate losses and book shift-to-loss transfer prices throughout the year rather than relying solely on topside, tax-only adjustments.
While the tax-motivated income shifting literature has largely ignored the impact of losses on cross-jurisdictional income shifting, the effect of losses on other types of tax efficient behavior has been studied. For example, Mackie-Mason (1990) finds that firms with loss carryforwards are significantly less likely to issue debt than firms without loss carryforwards.
More recently, Edgerton (2010) shows that firms with loss carryforwards elect bonus depreciation less frequently than fully taxable firms. In addition, De Simone, Robinson, and Stomberg (2014) provide evidence that firms are less likely to be tax aggressive if they have significant loss carryforwards. These papers estimate that losses significantly affect the taxrelated decisions studied, suggesting that losses' effect on transfer pricing is worth studying.
We connect these two lines of literature by more directly studying the impact of losses on cross-jurisdictional tax-motivated income shifting behavior. To do so, we develop a method to estimate the expected income of loss affiliates and examine the relation between unexplained profits and the benefits of a shift-to-loss strategy. Our work differs from the above studies because we posit that losses alter the tax planning strategy rather than simply lessening the tax planning incentives. In that sense, our approach is more like Erickson, Heitzman, and Zhang (2012) and Maydew (1997) who find evidence of tax-motivated inter-temporal loss shifting.
III. DIFFERENCE IN INCOME SHIFTING WITH A LOSS AFFILIATE
Model and Hypothesis
In a multinational group consisting exclusively of profitable affiliates, the traditional strategy of shifting income from high-tax affiliates to low-tax affiliates reduces worldwide taxes.
This paper suggests that the presence of loss affiliates temporarily confounds these traditional income shifting incentives both by providing high-tax profitable affiliates additional, potentially tax-minimizing recipients of shifted income and by altering the incentives of lower-tax affiliates.
Essentially, loss affiliates face a reduced marginal tax rate, potentially zero. Low-tax affiliates continue to have an incentive to receive shifted income but now also have affiliates potentially facing a zero-tax rate to whom they can shift income.
Hines and Rice (1994) develop a model in which each affiliate in a corporate group reports a pre-tax profit, π i , that is the sum of the pre-tax profit from the economic activity in the affiliate, ρ i , the amount of profit shifted into or out of the affiliate, ψ i , and the cost of any shifting, . ψ i would be positive for relatively low-tax affiliates and negative for relatively high-tax affiliates. 17 Algebraically, this is represented as follows:
(1)
The Hines and Rice (1994) approach is in the spirit of the "all parties, all taxes, all costs" framework of Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson (1992) in that it attempts to separately identify the 17 Although an affiliate could both receive shifted profit from a higher-tax affiliate and provide shifted profit to a lower-tax affiliate, we can only empirically estimate the net unexpected profit, the net value of ψ i .
benefits and costs associated with shifting income to an affiliate. In equilibrium, the firm maximizes overall profit, which equals the sum of after-local-tax profits of all its affiliates. Hines and Rice (1994) assume profits will not face repatriation taxes and that total profits shifted among affiliates is constrained to be less than or equal to zero.
Because Hines and Rice (1994) estimate their model at the jurisdiction level, aggregating the affiliates of all U.S. companies in the jurisdiction, they do not estimate the income shifted by a particular affiliate. Huizinga and Laeven (2008) , however, use this same model to estimate the equilibrium shifting at the affiliate level. Huizinga and Laeven (2008) show that the equilibrium profits shifted to or from affiliate i, ψ i , and the composite shifting incentive, C i , are:
The fraction of the affiliate's income shifted is based on the cost parameter, a, the affiliate i's statutory tax rate, τ i , and the weighted average of the difference in the affiliate's tax rate relative to each of the other affiliates' tax rates. Huizinga and Laeven (2008) note that C represents the tax incentive for a particular affiliate relative to others in its affiliated group in the same year.
Higher values of C indicate a high-tax affiliate within its group, resulting in a tax incentive to shift profits to affiliates in the group with lower values of C.
The Huizinga and Laeven (2008) model does not distinguish between profitable and loss
affiliates, that is whether ρ i is positive or negative. However, since the tax rate is typically the statutory tax rate and a negative value of ρ i would yield a negative weight, empirical estimates
where
based on this model employ only profitable firm-jurisdictions or profitable affiliates (e.g., Huizinga and Laeven 2008 , De Simone 2016 , Markle 2015 . To analyze the equilibrium income shifting if affiliate j has losses, we examine the effect of a discrete decrease in the tax rate for affiliate j;
18 that is, we assume losses will lower the net present value of taxes paid by the affiliate. To address the challenges that the above model faces in the presence of a loss affiliate, we make two changes to the cost of shifting. First, we replace pre-tax profit, ρ i , as the driver of the cost of income shifting with K i , where K i represents economic activities such as capital or labor. This is done to avoid negative weights for loss affiliates and is consistent with recent proposals from the OECD that suggest that the level of economic activity in a jurisdiction determines how much profit is reasonable in that jurisdiction (OECD, 2013) . Second, we model the cost of shifting as not tax deductible, consistent with an alternative specification considered by Huizinga and Laeven (2008) . 19 Whether income-shifting costs are tax deductible is not a primary focus of this paper and this alteration simplifies the model with no effect to inferences.
With these two alterations, the equilibrium shifting for affiliate i becomes the following:
The partial derivative of the affiliate's equilibrium shifted income, with respect to its tax incentive C i is -K i /a, and with respect to its tax rate, yields the following:
18 Throughout the remainder of this section, we denote the loss affiliate as affiliate j. 19 In their empirical estimates, Huizinga and Laeven (2008) use sales as a proxy for ρ. With regard to deductibility, in footnote 5, the authors state that the specification in which costs are not tax deductible, as in equation (3) here, obtains results quantitatively similar to their main specification. Non-deductible costs of income shifting include centrally borne compliance costs (not charged out to the affiliate) as well as potential penalties. In robustness tests, we confirm that our results are robust to their calculation of C that assumes the costs of shifting are tax deductible.
These derivatives are consistent with the standard negative relation between tax incentives and the profit reported in an affiliate, or more generally, in a jurisdiction.
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If affiliate j suffers a loss, we assume that the loss affects the expected present value of the tax rate for this affiliate, which we denote θτ j , where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. 21 We assume that the affiliate's capital, and therefore its cost of shifting, are unaffected by the loss. The resulting equilibrium shifting at the unprofitable affiliate j that results from the loss, relative to the equilibrium shifting had the affiliate been profitable, is as follows: (5) where the shifting superscripts denote a loss, L, or profit, P. If this difference is positive, additional amounts are shifted to a loss affiliate, and thus the reported profits in a loss affiliate will be higher. The effect of the loss on the equilibrium relation between the affiliate's tax incentives and its shifted income is as follows:
Thus, the difference in shifting behavior relative to the same affiliate if it reported profits is positively related to the tax incentive, and the degree to which it is positive increases as the affiliate's tax rate goes to zero (i.e., as θ approaches 0). It is also worth noting that if θ = 0, the 20 We assume the effect of the loss is to alter the present value of the statutory tax rate, rather than to alter the present value of the tax incentive variable C. Similar results are derived if the loss alters the affiliates value of C. 21 A tax rate for loss affiliates of zero is consistent with either affiliates in jurisdictions that do not allow consolidation, loss carryback or loss carryforward, or with affiliates that do not have fact patterns that will provide a benefit when these provisions are allowed (i.e., no profitable affiliate with the same direct parent in the jurisdiction, losses during the carryback period and expected losses during the carryforward period).
derivative of the amount shifting for the loss affiliate with respect to the tax rate (i.e., equation
(6) plus equation (4)), is positive.
The Appendix provides a numerical example of the effect of loss affiliates on income shifting. Given an assumed cost structure of income shifting (costs are quadratic, a = 10), Case 1 of the Appendix demonstrates that when all affiliates are profitable, income is shifted into affiliates with low tax incentives. Specifically, affiliate j receives 0.52 in income from the affiliates with high tax incentives, including affiliate k who shifts out 0.38 of income. In Case 2, affiliates j and k experience losses and now both receive income, of 0.83 and 0.53 respectively.
Thus, the income-shifting pattern changes in equilibrium. Further, the effect of the difference in tax incentives between affiliates becomes much less significant in the presence of losses (difference in ψ between affiliates j and k of 0.9 in Case 1 vs. 0.3 in Case 2) because high taxincentive affiliates alter their income shifting to a much greater extent than low tax-incentive affiliates when experiencing losses. That is, comparing Case 1 income shifting to Case 2 income shifting, the high tax-incentive affiliate changes from a provider of income to a recipient of income whereas the low tax-incentive affiliate alters its income shifting to a much smaller extent.
The existence of the loss alters the traditional relation between unexpected profit and the tax incentive, which is the basis for our first hypothesis:
H1:
The relation between unexplained profit and the tax incentives is less negative for loss affiliates than for profitable affiliates.
The above analysis does not consider the costs the company will bear to alter its income distribution strategy. Thus, our second hypothesis considers the cost-benefit trade-off a firm analyzes before deviating from a traditional income shifting strategy to adopt a shift-to-loss strategy; that is, shifting less profit out of a loss affiliate and potentially shifting profit from a profitable affiliate to a loss affiliate. If the costs of altering the income shifting strategies are large enough, the costs will exceed the benefits for some affiliates. It will be most likely that benefits exceed costs for affiliates with high benefits.
Holding θ constant, the worldwide tax savings due to adopting a shift-to-loss strategy are larger when the loss occurs in a higher tax rate loss affiliates than when the loss occurs in a lower tax rate loss affiliates. Said another way, the decrease in tax benefit due to θ (and thus the change in tax incentives due to θ) is increasing in the tax rate. The benefits of a shift-to-loss strategy in response to a high-tax loss affiliate will therefore be relatively large, making it more likely, on average, that the benefits will exceed the costs.
The Appendix provides a numerical example of this effect. Comparing income shifting, ψ, in Case 1 to Case 2, the high tax-incentive affiliate changes from a provider of income (ψ < 0)
to a recipient of income (ψ > 0), whereas the low tax-incentive affiliate alters its income shifting to a much smaller extent (ψ > 0 in both cases). The last line of the example calculates the difference in after-tax profit given a loss but using the traditional profit-shifting strategy in Case 1 and the new optimal shift-to-loss strategy in Case 2, ignoring costs to change the shifting strategy. This line shows that the benefit obtained by shifting into the high tax-rate loss affiliate, k, is much larger than that obtained by shifting into the low tax-rate loss affiliate, j. Thus, on average, we would expect a stronger reaction to losses by affiliates in high tax-rate jurisdictions:
H2:
The relation between unexplained profit and the tax incentives is less negative for relatively higher tax rate loss affiliates than for relatively lower tax rate loss affiliates.
Research Design and Variable Definitions
Hines and Rice (1994) and Huizinga and Laeven (2008) apply the Cobb-Douglas production function to estimate profits associated with the economic activity in a jurisdiction.
where ρ is the profit before shifting as in equation (1). Applying log transformations to both sides of equation (6) and incorporating equilibrium income shifting, as specified in the model above, yields the following estimation equation:
where K i is affiliate capital, L i is affiliate labor, A i is a measure of productivity, and TI i is a measure of affiliate's tax incentive (e.g., the jurisdiction's tax rate or C in Huizinga and Laeven, 2008) . β 5 is an empirical estimate of the average responsiveness to income-shifting incentives.
The model above is commonly used in the income shifting literature. However, it is not conducive to a study of loss affiliates because of its log specification. Claessens and Laeven (2004) avoid this limitation by specifying π i as return on assets (ROA) plus one. We also employ this approach, scaling the production function in equation (7) by assets and adding one to the dependent variable before taking logs. 22 This specification allows us to estimate our regressions on a sample that includes both profitable and unprofitable affiliates.
We add to the model variables intended to capture economic factors that induce losses because the Cobb-Douglas production function assumes all factors of production and their effects on output are positive. We include a proxy for the age of the firm because the lifecycle of the firm affects the probability of loss. Significant changes in the local economy or industry ("shocks") will affect reported profit, and thus we incorporate both a jurisdiction-year shock We alternatively measure TaxIncentive using an adaptation of C, the measure developed by Huizinga and Laeven (2008) to take into account the entire portfolio of tax rates faced by a firm, or the country-year statutory tax rate of the affiliate, STR. In our study, C represents a capital-weighted differential tax rate of the affiliate relative to all related firms in the same multinational group-year, as reflected in equation (3). To avoid multicollinearity when interactions are introduced, the affiliate-level tax rate variable STR is mean centered (Guenther 23 In untabulated tests, we observe similar signs, magnitudes and significance on all variables of interest when we specify profitability using pre-tax income (PLBT) instead of EBIT. 24 As an alternative, we follow Huizinga and Laeven (2008) and use the natural log of GDP per capita as the measure of productivity instead of industry-country-year ROA. We continue to include ΔGDP despite its higher correlation with lnGDP. Inferences remain unchanged. We observe similar signs, magnitudes, and significance on all variables except the tax incentive variables, the effect of which is larger than reported below. 25 We use median industry-country-year ROA as the measure of productivity instead of GDP because we include change in GDP as a proxy for economic shock. In untabulated tests, we also include the change in market share of the affiliate; however the coefficient on this variable is not statistically significant at conventional levels and so we exclude it from main tests.
and Sansing, 2010; Aiken and West, 1991) . 26 Loss equals one if EBIT is less than zero. The model described above, from which we derive our hypotheses, suggests that Loss should equal 1 if ρ, the profits before shifting, are negative. Though we use the sign of EBIT as our empirical proxy for the sign of ρ, the results are not sensitive to dropping or separately classifying observations with an ROA of less than 1.5 percent in absolute value. All measures are calculated at the affiliate-year, country-year, or country-industry-year level.
To test hypothesis H1, we interact Loss with TaxIncentive, as below: 
We continue to predict a positive coefficient β 9 following H1 and further predict a positive coefficient β 13 following H2. It is important to note that we use the statutory tax rate for our exploration of H2. In doing so, we draw a distinction between the tax incentive at the affiliate level, which considers the position of the particular affiliate within the corporate group, and the jurisdiction's tax rate that would apply broadly to all entities within that jurisdiction.
Sample
The Amadeus database contains financial and operating information on independent and 26 By construction, C is effectively mean-centered within firm. 27 In untabulated tests, we confirm results are robust to alternatively defining HighSTR as the top 20 percent and top 33 percent of the sample when using C or STR as the proxy for TaxIncentive.
affiliated European firms. We use unconsolidated company information from Amadeus over the period 2003 to 2012 for all tests. Our sample selection is detailed in Table 1 .
(insert Table 1 around here) Table 1 outlines that we limit our sample to controlled groups with at least one foreign affiliate with greater than 50 percent total (direct and indirect) ownership. 28 We require that both the parent and this foreign affiliate be located in Europe, where Amadeus includes more detailed information, and that the affiliate not be missing earnings before interest and taxes (Amadeus variable EBIT). These criteria yield a beginning sample of 222,461 affiliate-year observations.
To remain in the sample, we require an industry classification (NACE) code because we expect that profitability varies by industry and so include an industry-level shock measure. We exclude affiliated groups in banking and insurance industries because their profitability is less easily estimated using assets and compensation. We further require that the consolidated group be profitable, reporting a return on sales (∑PLBT/∑REV) of at least three percent, because consolidated losses create incentives to change the income shifting strategy that are unrelated to our research question (Stock, 2013) . 29 For the purposes of estimation, we require tangible fixed assets (TFAS) and total assets (TOAS), and compensation expense (STAF) to be positive and we require Age and both measures of shock (ΔGDP and ΔMktSize) for each affiliate. Affiliate-level data requirements and differences in reporting requirements across countries and entity types inevitably result in the inability to include in estimation all affiliates within a multinational group-year. Finally, we require ROA to be greater than or equal to -1.0. Our final sample consists 28 Ninety-nine percent of the affiliates in our sample are owned at least ninety percent. 29 We calculate consolidated return on sales for the affiliates in our sample, rather than use the consolidated figures available in Amadeus, to ensure that we appropriately measure the incentives and ability of the affiliates in our sample to achieve a shift-to-loss strategy. This approach also acknowledges that we do not have data for all affiliates in the corporate groups.
of 59,743 affiliate-years representing 2,662 unique controlled groups, of which Loss=1 for 11,838 affiliate-years and the remaining 47,905 affiliate-years are identified as profitable. (insert Table 2 around here) Table 4 around here)
Summary Statistics
IV. RESULTS
Results of tests of hypothesis H1
To provide baseline information, we first estimate precursors to the profit prediction model specified in equation (9). Table 5 , Panel A presents these regressions. On a sample of profitable affiliates, the Cobb-Douglas specification in column (1), using earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) as the measure of output, estimates coefficients consistent with prior research.
Specifically, ln(TangibleAssets), ln(CompExp) and IndustryROA are positively related to profitability as expected and the model achieves an R 2 of over 60 percent. When we measure output as ROA, we expect a negative coefficient on capital because we deflate both sides by
TangibleAssets before taking logs, and the Cobb-Douglas exponent on capital is generally assumed to be less than one. Consistent with this expectation, we report a negative coefficient on ln(TangibleAssets) in column (2). Ln(CompExp) and IndustryROA remain positively related to profitability. Though all of the coefficients other than ln(TangibleAssets) remain identical between columns (1) and (2), the R 2 in column (2) falls dramatically to only 13 percent because the ratio ROA has significantly more variance relative to size than does the level EBIT.
(insert Table 5 around here)
Finally, columns (3) and (4) introduce (ROA+1) as the measure of profitability. A comparison of columns (2) and (3) demonstrates that the addition of one to the ROA decreases the magnitude of the coefficients, but does not change the sign or significance of them. The purpose of adding one to ROA is to be able to include loss affiliates in the sample, and their 30 For example, Huizinga and Laeven (2008) report a correlation of 0.84 between Capital and Labor.
inclusion, in column (4), does significantly change regression estimates. In particular, the importance of both ln(TangibleAssets) and C is reduced whereas IndustryROA becomes more important to the model.
We test our first hypothesis in Panel B of Table 5 . To the model estimated in column (4) of Table 5 , Panel A, we add economic shock and intercept variables to improve the model's performance for loss affiliates in our hypothesis tests. Specifically, column (1) includes ln(Age) and the Shock variables and column (2) includes ln(Age), the Shock variables and the Loss indicator, as specified in equation (9). Both models implicitly estimate expected reported profit given economic shocks and traditional income tax shifting incentives. As expected, we estimate a negative coefficient on the Loss indicator. By including this indicator, the other variables better predict profitability. Specifically, the coefficient on IndustryROA returns to a level similar to that estimated on the all profitable sample in column (3) In column (3), we estimate the full model outlined in equation (10), which interacts the tax incentive variable with Loss to test hypothesis H1. Though the main effect of C has a coefficient that is significantly negative and consistent with Column (3) of Panel A, the interaction of C with the Loss indicator is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level of statistical significance, consistent with our first hypothesis. These results suggest that while profitable affiliates decrease profits reported in higher tax-rate jurisdictions, firms respond to the incentives induced by loss affiliates to reduce the shifting of profits out of these higher tax rate jurisdictions, and in fact report higher unexpected profits in such jurisdictions.
For profitable affiliates, we estimate a coefficient with respect to the composite tax incentive of −0.088 that translates to a semi-elasticity of -0.75 at the mean ROA, consistent with the past literature (Dharmapala, 2014) . However, the sum of coefficients with respect to the composite tax rate of loss affiliates is +0.162, translating to a semi-elasticity of +1.24 at the mean ROA. 31 Our point estimate for profitable affiliates implies that an increase of one standard deviation (0.047) in the tax rate incentives and mean return on assets of 13.3 is associated with a return on assets of 12.8, 0.5 percentage points lower. Our point estimate for unprofitable affiliates implies that an increase of one standard deviation in the tax rate incentives of an unprofitable affiliate with average return on assets of -11.6 is associated with a higher return on assets of -10.9, or 0.7 percentage points higher.
Though we provide an estimate above, interpreting differences in C is difficult. Consider the following simple example. For a multinational group with two similarly sized affiliates who are subject to the sample median statutory tax rate of 30 percent, an increase in an affiliate's own tax rate from 30 percent to 40 percent results in an increase in C approximately equal to the sample standard deviation of 0.047 used to calculate the figures above. In this simple example of only two affiliates in the multinational group, the same change in C for the same affiliate could instead be obtained by a decrease in the related affiliate's tax rate from 30 percent to 20 percent.
If we expand the group to three similarly-sized affiliates who face the sample median statutory rate, the statutory rate of the affiliate in question must increase to approximately 37.5 percent or the statutory rate of one of its affiliates must decrease to 15 percent to achieve the same standard deviation in C. If we remove the assumption that the affiliates are similarly-sized, the same increase in C would require a larger change in a smaller affiliate (smaller change in a larger affiliate) because C is capital-weighted. The complexity in our very simple example 31 The estimates are calculated as exp[coefficient on C*change in C + ln(mean ROA+1)]-1 and exp[(coefficient on C + coefficient on Loss*C)*change in C + ln(mean ROA+1)]-1, respectively. For the calculation of semi-elasticity, the change in C is 1%.
demonstrates that the possible avenues for achieving a 0.047 increase in C multiplies as the number of affiliates in the group increases and/or as the size of these affiliates differs.
Due both to the difficulty in interpreting results related to the composite tax variable, C, and to potential measurement error in C, we also test our hypotheses using the statutory tax rate. 32 Table 6 presents these results and mirrors Panel B of Table 5 using STR as the proxy for
TaxIncentive. 33 Results are again consistent with H1. We estimate a significantly negative relation between unexpected profit and the statutory tax rate for profitable affiliates but a significantly positive relation between unexpected profit and the statutory tax rate for loss affiliates. Our point estimates imply that a one percent increase in the statutory tax rate for profitable affiliates is associated with a 0.08 percentage point decrease in profitability, but that the same change in statutory rate for loss affiliates is associated with a 0.08 percent increase in profitability on average. 34 These two sets of tests provide support for our hypothesis that the reported profit of loss affiliates exhibits a different relation with tax incentives than does the reported profit of profitable affiliates.
(insert Table 6 around here)
The estimates in Panel B of Table 5 and in Table 6 provides insight into differences in unexpected reported profit that results from a large discrete change in tax rates within a single country, or large differences in tax rates across countries (e.g., from entering a tax haven).
Because the estimates involve affiliates that, if profitable, would face tax rates equal to the 32 The composite tax variable requires information on all affiliates of a multinational group to be complete. It is especially susceptible to mismeasurement when the missing affiliates are near the tails of the tax rate distribution. For example, omitted low-tax affiliates (such as haven affiliates and holding companies that may escape reporting requirements by having few assets or employees or unlimited liability) create mismeasurement because affiliates nearer the middle of the group's tax rate distribution (and thus having only a mild tax incentive) appear to be near the bottom of the distribution with a strong incentive to receive shifted income. 33 In untabulated tests, we estimate Panel A of Table 5 using STR for TaxIncentive. Results are qualitatively similar. 34 The estimate for profitable affiliates is calculated as exp[coefficient on STR*1% + ln(mean ROA+1)]-1, which reflects a decrease from the average ROA of 13.30 to 13.22. The estimate for loss affiliates is calculated as exp[(coefficient on STR + coefficient on Loss*STR)*1% + ln(mean ROA+1)]-1, which reflects an increase from the average ROA of -11.56 to -11.48. statutory tax rate but now are assumed to face a tax rate that is much lower, the estimates do not represent a marginal effect inherent in extant methods (i.e., those based on Hines and Rice, 1994, and summarized in Dharmapala, 2014) . However, because the losses are likely temporary, the shifting response to a loss affiliate is expected to be muted relative to a permanent change in tax rates to zero. The estimates therefore provide a lower bound on the difference in reported income that is introduced by a large difference in tax rates across affiliates and suggest that multinational firms respond to even temporary tax rate changes when those changes are large.
Results of tests of hypotheses H2
We next test our second hypothesis, that the difference in responsiveness of unexpected profit to tax incentives between profitable and loss affiliates is higher for affiliates located in a higher-tax jurisdiction. This hypothesis considers that high-tax profitable affiliates are providers of shifted income while a high-tax loss affiliate may become a recipient of shifted income, resulting in a larger difference in responsiveness than between low-tax profitable and loss affiliates, which are both expected to be recipients of shifted income, on average. We test H2 by incorporating an indicator variable, HighSTR, into our tests of H1, as specified in equation (11).
H2 predicts a positive coefficient on the interaction between HighSTR, Loss, and TaxIncentive. Table 7 presents results of our tests of H2. We use C as the TaxIncentive proxy in column
(1) while STR measures the tax incentive in column (2). We continue to estimate a negative coefficient on TaxIncentive and a positive coefficient on Loss*TaxIncentive in both specifications. These coefficients capture, respectively, the relation for profitable and loss affiliates not in the highest quartile of STR. We estimate insignificant coefficients on HighSTR*TaxIncentive, which is consistent with the level of the statutory tax rate not affecting the income shifting incentives of profitable affiliates. That is, we fail to show that profitable high-tax affiliates have a responsiveness to income-shifting incentives that is different from the responsiveness of profitable low-tax affiliates.
Consistent with H2, we estimate significantly positive coefficients on HighSTR*Loss*TaxIncentive. 35 This result suggests that the difference in the responsiveness of unexpected profit to the tax incentive is largest for affiliates located in relatively high statutory tax rate jurisdictions. Specifically, for the estimates in column (1) using C, we estimate that a one percent increase in the statutory tax rate for the average loss affiliate increases reported profit (decreases reported loss) by 6.66 percent when the affiliate faces high tax rates but increases reported profit (decreases reported loss) by only 0.86 percent when the affiliate faces low tax rates. Thus, though experiencing a loss alters the income shifting for the average loss affiliate and its related profitable affiliates, the difference relative to traditional income shifting incentives is most pronounced for high-tax loss affiliates.
(insert Table 7 around here)
V. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND ROBUSTNESS
Additional Analyses
We extend our analysis to consider that, if loss affiliates are receiving more shifted income or providing less shifted income, profitable affiliates must balance this difference. We analyze the entire affiliated group and create a binary variable that indicates whether a profitable affiliate has any loss affiliates and include this variable in equation (10). If profitable affiliates become less sensitive to typical tax incentives because the traditional strategy is being disrupted, we expect the interaction of this indicator variable with the tax incentive proxies to be positive. If loss affiliates are ignored in the transfer pricing strategy, with profit shifting continuing as 35 In untabulated tests, we replace HighSTR with HighC in tests where we use C as the proxy for TaxIncentive.
Coefficients become approximately half as large, suggesting some noise in the measure.
normal among the profitable affiliates, we expect this coefficient to be zero. Table 8 presents results of estimating this equation using C and STR in turn as proxies for the tax incentive.
(insert Table 8 around here)
We continue to estimate a negative relation between unexpected profit and tax incentives for profitable firms in an all-profitable affiliated group and that this relation is significantly less negative (and even significantly positive) for loss affiliates in other affiliated groups. The coefficient on ProfitWithLossAff*TaxIncentive is significantly positive, suggesting that profitable affiliates in groups with a loss affiliate are less sensitive to the traditional income shifting tax incentives. Overall these results confirm that loss affiliates are disruptive to the traditional pattern of high-tax to low-tax income shifting.
Comparing results in Table 8 to results elsewhere in the paper also provides evidence regarding the degree of understatement in previous research. In Panel A of Table 5 , we estimate a coefficient for profitable affiliates of -0.095. We estimate a similar coefficient in Panel B when we separate the profitable affiliates from loss affiliates. However, in both tests, the group of profitable affiliates includes both those in an all-profitable group and those with a loss affiliate.
In Table 8 , when we separate these two types of profitable affiliates, we estimate a significantly larger coefficient (-0.176) for those in an all-profitable group. The coefficients in the two tables imply semi-elasticities of -0.81 and -1.50, respectively. Thus, controlling for the effect of loss affiliates on the incentives of their profitable affiliates almost doubles the semi-elasticity.
We further examine whether the presence of a loss affiliate in a multinational group-year biases the estimated effect of an affiliate's tax incentives on reported profits. Specifically, we reestimate the first three columns (the EBIT > 0 specifications) reported in Panel A of Tables 5 but   include a group-year indicator variable equal to 1 if the affiliate has a related unprofitable affiliate. We interact this indicator variable with the tax incentive variable to capture the difference in the responsiveness to income-shifting incentives of profitable affiliates in the presence of loss affiliates relative to an all-profitable group. We obtain a significant coefficient on the interaction when using Log(ROA+1) as the dependent variable with the tax incentive variable C, suggesting some bias to the estimated effect of the tax incentive variable C in the presence of loss affiliates. The similar coefficients on the interactions lack significance when using the other dependent variables or STR as the tax incentive variable.
Robustness tests
To confirm the robustness of our results to sample selection decisions, we undertake a number of additional tests. First, we consider our inability to observe data for all affiliates.
Limiting our sample to multinationals with only affiliates for which we have data, drastically reduces our sample to 9,442 affiliate-years when using the tax incentive variable C and 10,044
affiliate-years when using the tax incentive variable STR. Nonetheless, estimating our tests on this sub-sample generates similar inferences as those reported in Tables 5 and 6 . When testing H1, we estimate a larger magnitude for the effect of the tax incentive variable C on reported profits (-0.1574, p-value < 0.01) when restricting our sample to fully-observable group-years and on the interaction between C and Loss (0.4563, p-value = 0.04), however the economic significance of the interaction is weaker. We observe a similar pattern of results on STR (-0.0883, p-value < 0.01) and the interaction between STR and Loss (0.3758, p-value = 0.02).
Second, we consider the sensitivity of results to requiring group ROS greater than or equal to three percent. We test three alternative group ROS cut-offs: 2 percent, 1 percent, and 0 percent. In all specifications, we continue to find signs, magnitudes, and significance of all variables consistent with those reported in Tables 5 and 6 . Finally, results are also largely unaffected when calculating ROS using profit reported in the parent company's consolidated financial statements, instead of calculating a group-wide ROS based on affiliate-level financials.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our paper studies a tax-motivated income shifting strategy that exploits losses earned by unprofitable affiliates of a multinational group. By shifting income from profitable affiliates to loss affiliates, multinational corporations can reduce their worldwide tax burden. However, there are considerable costs associated with this strategy such that its usage should not be assumed.
Thus, we test whether a shift-to-loss strategy is employed on average. We also consider which loss affiliates report the largest difference in unexpected profit.
We first provide evidence that the sign on the coefficient for the tax incentive variable reverses for loss affiliates relative to profitable affiliates. This result is consistent with use of a shift-to-loss strategy. Next, we find that loss affiliates in jurisdictions in the highest-quartile of statutory tax rates report a more significant difference in the responsiveness of their unexpected profit to tax incentives relative to other loss affiliates. Finally, we further verify use of a shift-toloss strategy by documenting that the profitable affiliates of loss affiliates are less sensitive to the traditional income shifting strategy than are profitable affiliates in all-profitable groups.
Together, these findings deepen our understanding of multinational income shifting strategies.
The estimation methods we employ allow for the inclusion of unprofitable affiliates in future income shifting studies. Specifically, using return on assets plus one allows for the inclusion of most observable affiliate-years while keeping the traditional log-log specification used in many prior studies. Further, we include several proxies for economic shock that improve the explanatory power of the models when including unprofitable affiliates. We look forward to future research using these methods, for example to explore the methods multinational firms undertake to shift profits to loss affiliates or to consider the costs associated with undertaking such a strategy. Numerical Example
We present below the calculation of the tax incentive variable C and equilibrium profits shifted using equation (3) for two cases: (1) all affiliates are profitable, and (2) affiliate i is profitable but affiliates j and k report a pre-shifting loss. The change in income shifting behavior between the two cases, given by equation (5), is computed for all three affiliates, assuming the loss affects the expected present value of the tax rate for an affiliate as we model through θ. We make the size of the loss affiliates the same to simplify the exercise. Throughout these examples we use capital as the proxy for economic activity K and hold the cost shifting parameter, a, constant at 10.
Affiliate: We calculate C as defined by Huizina and Laeven (2008) as the capital-weighted differential statutory tax rate faced by each affiliate. A negative value of C suggests that the group's tax incentives are to shift income into the affiliate (net recipient of shifted profit). For example, in Case 1, Affiliate j has a lower tax rate than the other affiliates, and the resulting value of C is negative, reflecting an incentive to shift income into that affiliate. In contrast, a positive value of C suggests that the group's tax incentives are to shift income out of the affiliate (net provider of shifted profit). For example, in Case 1, the two relatively high tax affiliates i and k have positive values of C and negative equilibrium income shifting. When taking into account the effect of losses in Case 2, the tax incentive becomes stronger (i.e., more positive) for the profitable affiliate i to shift income out relative to Case 1. In Case 1, the tax incentive for the profitable relatively high-tax affiliate k suggests an incentive to shift income out, but when k incurs a loss in Case 2, the equilibrium shifting strategy changes due to a tax incentive to shift income out. As a relatively low-tax affiliate, affiliate j exhibits a tax incentive to receive shifted income in both Case 1 and Case 2. However, the response is larger when affiliate j incurs a loss.
The reported after-tax profit (loss), π, is calculated as economic profit, ρ, plus income shifted, ψ, less taxes at rate θτ and the cost of shifting, a/2*ψ 2 /ρ. These calculations ignore the costs of changing the income distribution strategy to take advantage of the losses. The difference in π due to the implementation of a to shift-to-loss strategy is calculated as the difference between π in Case 2 and π that would have been reported if a traditional strategy were still employed (i.e., ρ, θ and τ in Case 2 coupled with ψ in Case 1). The sample consists of a total of 59,743 European affiliate-years [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes. ROA is EBIT scaled by Assets, where Assets is total assets. TangibleAssets is total fixed assets. CompExp is compensation expense. ln(EBIT) is the natural log of EBIT, ln(ROA) is the natural log of ROA, ln(ROA+1) is the natural log of ROA plus one, ln(TangibleAssets) is the natural log of TangibleAssets, and ln(CompExp) is the natural log of CompExp. IndustryROA is country-yearindustry median ROA for all observable companies in Amadeus. Age equals year t minus the year the affiliate first appears in the Amadeus database. ΔGDP is GDP in year t less GDP in year t-1, scaled by GDP in year t-1. ΔMktSize is the country-industry-year sum of affiliate and standalone firm sales in year t less the sum in year t-1, scaled by 1,000,000. Loss is set to 1 if affiliate EBIT is less than zero. C is the capital-weighted differential statutory tax rate between the affiliate and all related affiliates in the same group-year. STR is statutory tax rate. ROS is EBIT scaled by Sales, where Sales is operating revenues (net). ln denotes the natural log of the term in parentheses. EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes. ROA is EBIT scaled by Assets, where Assets is total assets. TangibleAssets is total fixed assets. CompExp is compensation expense. IndustryROA is country-year-industry median ROA of all observable companies in Amadeus. Age equals year t minus the year the affiliate first appears in the Amadeus database. ΔGDP is GDP in year t less GDP in year t-1, scaled by GDP in year t-1. ΔMktSize is the country-industry-year sum of all firm sales in year t less the sum in year t-1, scaled by 1,000,000. Loss is set to 1 if EBIT is less than zero. C is a capital-weighted differential statutory tax rate between the affiliate and all related affiliates in the same group-year. STR is the country-year statutory tax rate. (4) . EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes. ln(EBIT) is the natural log of EBIT. ROA is EBIT scaled by Assets, where Assets is total assets. ln(ROA) is the natural log of ROA. ln(ROA+1) is the natural log of ROA plus 1. ln(TangibleAssets) is the natural log of total fixed assets. ln(CompExp) is the natural log of compensation expense. IndustryROA is a measure of country-year-industry median ROA. C is a capital-weighted differential statutory tax rate between the affiliate and all related affiliates in the same group-year. All specifications report standard errors clustered by group. *, **, and *** represent one-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
45
This table estimates tests of H1 on a sample of 56,087 European affiliate-years 2003-2012 with at least one foreign affiliated firm also located in Europe and sufficient data from Amadeus and the European Commission for estimation. The dependent variable is ln(ROA+1), the natural log of EBIT scaled by Assets plus 1. ln(TangibleAssets) is that natural log of total fixed assets. ln(CompExp) is the natural log of compensation expense. IndustryROA is a measure of country-year-industry median ROA. ln(Age) is the natural log of Age, measured as year t minus the year the affiliate first appears in the Amadeus database. ΔGDP is GDP in year t less GDP in year t-1, scaled by GDP in year t-1. ΔMktSize is the country-industry-year sum of all affiliate and standalone firm sales in year t less the sum in year t-1, scaled by 1,000,000. C is the capital-weighted average differential statutory tax rate between the affiliate and all other related affiliates in the same group-year. Loss is set to 1 if affiliate EBIT is less than zero. All specifications report standard errors clustered by group. *, **, and *** represent one-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. (2) as well as on the sample of 56,087 affiliates with sufficient data for estimation in Column (1). ln(ROA+1) is the natural log of ROA plus 1. ROA is EBIT scaled by Assets, where EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes and Assets is total assets. ln(TangibleAssets) is the natural log of total fixed assets. ln(CompExp) is the natural log of compensation expense. IndustryROA is a measure of country-year-industry median ROA. ln(Age) is the natural log of Age, measured as year t minus the year the affiliate first appears in the Amadeus database. ΔGDP is GDP in year t less GDP in year t-1, scaled by GDP in year t-1. ΔMktSize is the country-industry-year sum of all affiliate and standalone firm sales in year t less the sum in year t-1, scaled by 1,000,000. TaxIncentive is C in column (1) and STR in column (2). C is a capitalweighted differential statutory tax rate between the affiliate and all related affiliates in the same group-year. STR is the meancentered country-year statutory tax rate. Loss is set to 1 if affiliate EBIT is less than zero. HighSTR is an indicator variable set to 1 if the affiliate's STR is in the top quartile by year. All specifications report standard errors clustered by group. *, **, and *** represent one-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. -years 2003-2012 with at least one foreign affiliated firm also located in Europe and sufficient data from Amadeus and the European Commission for estimation in Column (2) as well as on the sample of 56,087 affiliates with sufficient data for estimation in Column (1). ). ln(ROA+1) is the natural log of ROA plus 1. ROA is EBIT scaled by Assets, where EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes and Assets is total assets. ln(TangibleAssets) is the natural log of total fixed assets. ln(CompExp) is the natural log of compensation expense. IndustryROA is a measure of country-year-industry median ROA. ln(Age) is the natural log of Age, measured as year t minus the year the affiliate first appears in the Amadeus database. ΔGDP is GDP in year t less GDP in year t-1, scaled by GDP in year t-1. ΔMktSize is the country-industry-year sum of all affiliate and standalone firm sales in year t less the sum in year t-1, scaled by 1,000,000. TaxIncentive is C in column (1) and STR in column (2). C is a capital-weighted differential statutory tax rate between the affiliate and all related affiliates in the same group-year. STR is the mean-centered country-year statutory tax rate. AllProfit is an indicator variable set to 1 if all affiliates in the same multinational group-year have EBIT greater than or equal to zero. Loss is an indicator variable set to 1 if affiliate EBIT is less than zero. ProfitWithLossAff is an indicator variable set to 1 if affiliate EBIT is greater than or equal to zero but there is a related affiliated in the same multinational group-year with EBIT less than zero. We suppress the intercept when estimating these models. All specifications report standard errors clustered by group. *, **, and *** represent onetailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
